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clude seminars and lectures; media programs and web-based activities; research 
projects and policy study groups.  The Center is an integral part of the Johns Hopkins 
University's Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), one of Amer-
ica's leading graduate schools devoted to the study of international relations. The Center 
has been recognized by the European Commission as one of a select number of EU 
Centers of Excellence in the United States. The Center also leads the international policy 
work of the Johns Hopkins-led National Center for the Study of Preparedness and Cata-
strophic Event Response (PACER). 
 
About the FRS 
The Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique, located in Paris, is the leading French 
think tank on defense and security issues. FRS conducts studies for French government 
departments and agencies, European institutions, international organizations and private 
companies. It contributes to the strategic debate in France, in Europe and abroad. The 
Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique has an interdisciplinary team of thirty research-
ers: experts in international and strategic matters, political scientists, engineers, scientists 
and former military. Its expertise covers the full spectrum of security and defence issues, 
from the analysis of technical-operational aspects, to in-depth knowledge of strategic 
areas, including terrorism, CT terrorism, homeland security, WMD proliferations. 
 
The Transatlantic security paper series are technical-operational essays or reports our 
institutes consider should be made available as a contribution to the debate on topical 
issues relevant to security/safety in the United States or in Europe (Contact: Jean-Luc 
Marret – jl.marret@frstrategie.org or jmarret1@jhu.edu). 
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Recherche strategique. 
Transatlantic Security Paper N.1 – April 2010 
 
3 
 
 
The Author 
Dr. Jean-Luc Marret is a Senior Fellow at the Center for Transatlantic Relations and a 
Senior Fellow at the Fondation pour la Recherche Stratégique. He is currently working on 
counter-terrorism, radicalism/de-radicalization, homeland security, conflicts and conflict 
prevention (non-state actors, NGOs, cultural intelligence) issues. He has published nu-
merous books in French and other languages (jl.marret@frstrategie.org, jmar-
ret1@jhu.edu). 
Transatlantic Security Paper N.1 – April 2010 
 
4 
 
 
 
Contents 
 
Introduction ................................................................................................ 5 
South Korean Flight 858 ............................................................................ 5 
MANPADS ................................................................................................. 6 
Unequal Levels of Security at Airports ....................................................... 8 
Techniques of Destruction of Planes ......................................................... 8 
Trade vs. Safety ...................................................................................... 10 
The Shield vs. The Sword ....................................................................... 11 
The Jihadi Practices of Destruction of Planes ......................................... 12 
 
 
Transatlantic Security Paper N.1 – April 2010 
 
5 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Data published by the Federal Aviation Administration (F.A.A.) in its "Annual report 
on the criminal acts against civil aviation" indicates that in the year 1960, there have been 
fifteen attacks onboard planes leaving 286 dead; 44 in the year 1970 with 650 dead 
(mostly hijackings); and 26 in the 1980s leaving 1207 dead. In the 1970s, the record is 
established by the year 1976 (168 dead).The three years - 1985 (390), 1988 (287), and 
1989 (278) - were more deadly than the 1960s all together. These casualties were largely 
provoked by IEDs. Since the end of 1980 - the deadliest decade, with the exception of 
September 11, 2001 -, it is however a rare practice.  
 
The reasons for the decline in big and politically motivated hijackings were varied. 
One could have been the improvement of the effectiveness of the safety response by 
States, airports and companies. The improvised explosive device (I.E.D.) posed a serious 
threat to the civil aviation industry in the 1980s. Since the 1990s, the jihadi networks have 
regularly tried to target aircrafts using various types of IEDs. 
 
South Korean Flight 858 
 
 Initially, and similarly for hijackings, the plane is a symbol. Air France represents 
France, an El Al flight- Israel, Aeroflot- Russia. Beyond the company, the State itself is 
targeted. The nationality of the passengers is as much a factor as the destination of the 
plane. 
 
 Planes are built from fragile materials. One needs only a few strategically placed 
explosives to destroy them. The Boeing 747 was destroyed above Lockerbie in Decem-
ber 1988 using 285 grams of Semtex i.e. the weight of vole of quarters (Cf. below). 
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The terrorists or operational intelligence officers - seeking a spectacular and 
dramatic media effect - generally target international flights with passengers of several 
nationalities. The destruction of South Korean flight 858 in 1987 was thus orchestrated by 
North Korea. South Korea became a target because it was going through a fluid political 
phase with the constitution being revised and elections due at the end of the year.
i
 The 
aim was to plunge South Korea into chaos and prevent it from hosting the Olympic 
Games in Seoul. The North Koreans estimated that no State would entrust its athletes to 
the South Korean authorities due to the terrorist threat. Korean Air was en route from Abu 
Dhabi to Bangkok on 29
th
 November, 1987, when it exploded over the Andaman Sea, 
killing all 115 on board. Two North Korean agents had boarded the plane in Bagdad and 
disembarked during its stopover in Abu Dhabi leaving behind a timed IED in an overhead 
compartment. The agents were arrested in Bahrain while using fake Japanese passports, 
and both immediately swallowed cyanide capsules.
ii
 The male died instantly, but the fe-
male suspect, Kim Hyon Hui, survived and later publicly expressed remorse. She ex-
plained that they had left a radio containing 350 grams of C-4 explosive and a liquor bot-
tle containing approximately 700 ml of PLX explosive (Picatinny Liquid Explosive, a liquid 
binary explosive) in an overhead rack in the passenger cabin.
iii
  
 
When a plane is destroyed over a sea or an ocean, very little traces of explosives 
remain as evidence. Any residual explosives get diluted in water. A recent example 
proved the difficulties which could emerge from such a crash: In July 1996, T.W.A. Flight 
800 exploded at an altitude of 4,175 meters. It hit the sea 26 seconds later and its debris 
was scattered over 2.4 kilometres. If we assume the explosion was due to a technical 
defect,
iv
 the rumour about a missile only highlighted the difficulties of the investigation. 
The assumption of the missile-attack appealed to the media because it had the attraction 
of being a new means of destroying an aircraft. 
 
MANPADS 
 
The threat of missile-attacks is not new either. For the terrorists, the advantage of 
this weapon was that it could be carried out by only one person, and it was particularly 
reliable against a large civil aircraft flying at low altitude. Sometime towards Christmas in 
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1974, a Palestinian commando based in Paris, finally accepted a Soviet anti-tank device- 
Rpg-7. In January 1975, the terrorists fired two rockets at an El Al plane at the Orly air-
port using this weapon. The rocket made a hole in the wing of a Yugoslav plane which 
was taxing on the runway and wounded a French police officer on guard onboard. Six 
days after this more or less failed attempt, and as the safety of the Orly airport was in-
creased to 750 men, a similar attempt was made, but failed, thanks to the vigilance of 
security forces.  
 
 The portable ground-to-air missiles, MANPAD (Man Portable Air Defense Sys-
tem), are allegedly a major threat to civil aviation. It is actually surprising that there have 
not been any more attempts at deployment. This type of missile is in the hands of about 
thirty political organizations committed to intra-state conflicts in Africa, Central Asia and in 
the Caucasus. Moreover, they seem rather easily available in the black market. Attacks 
on civilian aircrafts flying at low altitude (using the US FIM-92 Stinger, Mistral, Javelin, 
Strela-2 and –3, Igla-1, or quite simply a RPG) were numerous since the 1970s, but con-
sidering that the civilian aircrafts with many passengers did not grab the attention of the 
media, other aircrafts became targets. Thus in October 1993, an American helicopter Mh-
60 Black Hawk was brought down by Somali militants. The attack (using materials of 
Russian origin) on an Israeli charter plane at the time of takeoff on 28
th
 November, 2002, 
with 260 passengers onboard is the last and most spectacular example of all. The easy 
availability of such weapons and their dramatic effects (destruction of a plane and possi-
ble crash over dwellings) make them an inevitable choice in unleashing terror. However, 
the danger seems to be overestimated. If the proliferation of MANPADS is as alarming as 
it is sometimes made out to be, then, civil aviation would have faced numerous losses.  
The MANPADS that are in the hands of non-state armed groups- for example, the LTTE - 
have been provided by a State in the 1970s and 1980s, or bought in the illegal market. 
Hence, some of their components such as batteries could be not working anymore.
v
 
 
Why were the destructions of civilian aviation so effective in the 1980s? Airports 
around the world were prepared to counter the threat of hijackings, which was the hall-
mark of the attacks in the 1970s. The terrorists changed their modus operandi from hi-
jackings to bombings as to adapt to the airports and civilian aviation safety standards, 
designed in reaction to hijackings. 
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 Unequal Levels of Security at Air-
ports 
 
 In the 1980s, it was difficult to distinguish between certain explosives like Sem-
tex, which can be moulded to take the shape of objects (plates, mugs etc.).
 
In London, in 
May 1989, the police force discovered boxes of what looked like Middle-Eastern candies. 
On inspection it was revealed that the candies had been replaced by Semtex of the same 
colour and consistency. The design of “luggage-bombs” (with a detonator hidden in a 
standard "computer" or "radio" came from the military uses of booby traps made with 
plastic explosives. Everything can become a bomb or hide a bomb. The Lockerbie at-
tack
vi
 which left 270 dead was thus carried out using 285 grams of Semtex hidden in a 
Toshiba radio packed in a bag of clothing. The bag travelled from Malta to Frankfurt, and 
was then transferred on Pan Am Flight 103 bound for New York via London, without their 
owners on board.
vii
 
 
 It should be admitted that the transfer of luggage from an unreliable country can 
be problematic from a security point of view. For example, in the Brazzaville attack in 
September 1989, a bag filled with explosives was placed in the compartments of DC-10 
of U.T.A. bound for Paris via N’Djamena. The attack claimed 171 lives.
viii
  This incident 
also illustrates the possibility of terrorist operational cells using an innocent third person 
to assemble the bomb onboard the plane. Often when a passenger is late for a flight, the 
security check is slackened to enable the scheduled departure time of the flight. Terrorist 
groups could take advantage of this situation to slip past security. Lastly, people them-
selves are used to carry the bombs without having to bother about concealing them in the 
luggage. 
 
 Techniques of Destruction of 
Planes 
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 The following cases will illustrate the frequency of the attacks and the various 
techniques employed. The terrorist’s action however is not without risks and is not a 
guaranteed success. The police most often intervene in a pre-emptive way by detecting 
bags planted in an airport. Sometimes the passengers themselves pre-empt an attack: 
 
 In August 1982, a sudden explosion on Pan Am Flight 830 from Tokyo to Hono-
lulu killed several Japanese citizens and wounded fifteen others. The bomb was of the 
same type as that found a few days later onboard a 747 in Rio de Janeiro before it ex-
ploded.
ix
 On closer examination by American experts, it was concluded that the mecha-
nism/trigger, installed with the bomb under the seat of a passenger could detonate the 
bomb from a seating position. The machine was hidden in a kind of document-case while 
the timer could make a seven-hour calculation. 
 
 The purchase of a ticket for the last time and the absence of the passenger in the 
flight are an alarming sign of a potential terrorist act. In June 1984, a Boeing 747 of Air 
India
x
 disappeared abruptly over the sea off the coast of Cork in Ireland. All 329 passen-
gers were killed. Less than one hour later, the same day, a piece of luggage exploded in 
a container coming from Canada. The luggage had just been off loaded from a Canadian 
Pacific plane at Tokyo airport.  The Air India flight disintegrated just as it was descending 
towards London before flying on to Mumbai. On the radars, the Air India went out with a 
blip suggesting that it fell down like a stone. Besides, the point of impact with the sea 
confirmed that it had hit the water vertically. This indication is invaluable and characteris-
tic of an explosion onboard. Even with very serious electronic or mechanical problems, a 
Boeing 747 is capable of steering several kilometres, and "to even plane" 150 km without 
its four engines.  
 
 In this case, the safety procedures were not properly adhered to. In fact, it be-
came an example of what should not be done. The luggage was not adequately moni-
tored, and on the Canadian Pacific, the unidentified baggage was not offloaded. Other 
planes which fell prey to terrorist bombings in the 1980s reveal a real sophistication in the 
kind of bombs used. In February 1986, an IED was found by the Israeli security services. 
It was particularly sophisticated as it was composed of explosive PETN hidden in thin 
layers at the bottom and corners of the bag. A barometric sensor, an electric detonator in 
contact with the explosive and an electronic timer were to start the detonation. A 
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“stop/interlocking” button made it possible to transport the bomb without any danger. This 
barometric sensor was intended to guarantee that the explosion would happen at a cer-
tain altitude during the flight. It engaged at a certain altitude, signalled the countdown to 
the explosion and stopped when the plane went down again under programmed altitude 
(such as for a stopover). It appears that the terrorists using such systems are remarkably 
informed and aware that many compartments of the civilian aircrafts are pressurized. If 
the civilian aircrafts fly to altitudes of 12,000 meters, the pressurization of the compart-
ments never exceeds the equivalent of an altitude of 3,000 meters. The terrorists thus 
program their barometric sensor to trigger the explosion of the bomb at around 2,800 me-
tres. 
 
 Trade vs. Safety  
 
 If some states are too poor to set up modern security systems at their airports, 
the commercial viability is at odds with the safety requirements in these states. Hence, 
security is entrusted to the airline companies or private companies. This is the case in 
North America. In the United States, one such airline company entrusted its security 
evaluation to an Israeli company but applied the recommendations of this company only 
to half of its installations around the world for lack of financing. 
 
 Yet, in the mid-1980s, all American airports continued with the practice of “curb 
side in check in” i.e. passengers could check-in their baggage as soon as they arrived at 
the airport (before they actually entered the airport). This way, no one could guarantee 
the safety of these bags on their way from the taxi and to the cabin of the plane. 
 
 The French board of inquiry looking into the destruction of DC.-10 of U.T.A. in the 
desert of Ténéré in September 1989 denounced the safety measures at the airport of 
Brazzaville from where the plane took-off. The dimensions of the air terminal were criti-
cized for being too modest for the number of passengers. Also, there were too many si-
multaneous boarding of flights. The airport was also criticised for not checking-in passen-
gers and luggage at the same place. The public spaces, restricted areas and the bag-
gage carrousel were easily accessible. As in the United States, the passengers did not 
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have to be present in person to check-in their luggage. This facilitated substitution or ad-
dition of luggage. Finally, passengers did not have to identify their luggage.
xi
 
 
 The Shield vs. the Sword 
 
 Given the numerous terrorist threats, the limitations of airport security and the 
vulnerability of planes, do solutions actually exist? In the 1990s, pragmatic remedies be-
gan to emerge. In London, for example, new technologies in Terminal 1 made it possible 
to systematically check all the luggage onboard flights bound for Ulster and passengers 
were not allowed to carry hand baggage. In Tel Aviv, the passengers must present them-
selves at the security check-point two hours before the departure of the plane and, on the 
road towards the airport, the police inspect all cars. Each passenger is then questioned 
on the contents of their luggage. El Al has its own security service at each one of its 
stopovers. In the mid-1980s, El Al removed its flights to Bucharest because the local au-
thorities did not authorize this system. Lastly, there are two to four security agents on 
each El Al flight. They are armed with small-gauged revolvers, sufficient enough to kill but 
not powerful enough to pierce the fuselage and risk depressurization. 
 
 More substantial measures such as the detection and marking of explosives are 
under consideration or in the process of application. These measures obviously cannot 
guarantee the total safety of a plane.  
 
 At present, there are three methods for the detection of explosives: the imagery 
X-ray; the detection of the “molecular vapour” of the explosives; and nuclear detection. 
But still, no particular technique has proved to be effective enough.  
 
 In the US today, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) uses the fol-
lowing equipment: 
 
 More than 900 “advanced technology X-ray Systems.” This technology 
allows operators to see the luggage from multiple angles. Some of these 
new machines also have a high-resolution zoom capacity. 
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 34 CastScope machines. These x-ray machines, deployed at 11 airports, 
are used to examine casts or prosthetic limbs to make sure they do not 
contain explosives or weapons. 
 Explosive Detection System. This system, which works like a Magnetic 
Resonance Imaging (MRI), is standard at many airports and is used to 
screen checked baggage for weapons and explosives. 
 
 The installation of body scanners is interesting from a security point of view but at 
the same time poses many questions concerning privacy. But even here, one can count 
on the terrorists to come up with innovative solutions- one of them being to put explosives 
inside the body. For instance, liquid explosives could be hidden in an encasement of sili-
cone implants or in the body, in the same way as narcotics.
xii
 
 
 The Jihadi Practices of Destroying 
Planes 
 
 The jihadi networks renewed the terrorists’ interest in the destruction of civilian 
aircrafts. They did it in their own way, taking into consideration the methods adopted in 
the 1980s and 1990s, and also the heterogeneity of their militants. The 11
th
 September, 
2001 attack is a hybrid form of different techniques: hijacking, and using an airplane as a 
kinetic object to take advantage of its speed and weight to destroy hard-targets, critical 
infrastructures etc. 
 
 If it is always difficult to believe in statements of arrested individuals or police re-
marks which could sometimes be “spectacularized” for legal purposes, it is highly possi-
ble to distinguish some trends in jihadi practices here. 
 
 The jihadi networks are very heterogeneous and decentralized. In general, there 
seems to be a certain correlation between the complexity of the attack (because of the 
number of planes to be attacked simultaneously, or the type of IED to be used) and the 
profile of the operational militants engaged in the operation. 
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 One can distinguish here two types of jihadi operations. One is the sophisticated 
operation with trained militants. They are very skilled, and help plan a coordinated opera-
tion against many targets. The other is a “one-shoot” operation that exploits the statistical 
probability of such an attack being successful. The second kind of operation is generally 
carried out by isolated individuals who are indoctrinated by radicals in radical incubators.  
 
The “inaugural” operation, the famous “Bojinka plot” was a planned large-scale 
terrorist attack by Ramzi Yousef and his uncle, Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, to blow up a 
dozen airliners along with approximately 4,000 passengers as they flew from Asia to the 
United States. This plot was disrupted after a chemical fire drew the attention of the Fili-
pino police on 6
th
 January and 7
th
 January, 1995. Before carrying out their attack on the 
airliners, Yousef decided to do a trial run of the operation. In December 1994, a bomb 
exploded onboard a Philippine Airlines flight from Manila-Tokyo. One passenger was 
killed, and twelve were wounded, but the plane managed to land in Okinawa.
xiii
  It turned 
out that the bomb had been assembled in the toilets of the plane by placing nitro-
glycerine in a case of contact lenses with an alarm clock as the detonator. 
 
The lessons learned by the masterminds of this plot were apparently used and 
put to use by those involved in the 11
th
 September attacks. One can observe some simi-
larities between the two plots. Both plots focused on the United States and intended to 
target airliners simultaneously. The funding for both operations was low-profile and frag-
mented (micro-funding techniques such as money laundering and small international 
transfers). The difficulty in handling unstable chemical substances (the fire which led to 
Yousef’s arrest) forced the 11
th
 September conspirators to revert to the old technique of 
hijacking. On the other hand, the safety measures introduced after 9/11 made the use of 
weapons difficult (knives, scissors etc.), thus renewing the operational interest in IEDs.  
 
After a few operational tests, another type of IED was developed which consisted 
of the use of Casio digital watches as timers, stabilisers that looked like cotton wool balls 
and nitro-glycerine as the explosive.
xiv
 Other ingredients may have included glycerin, ni-
trate, sulfuric acid, and minute concentrations of nitro-benzene, silver azide (silver trini-
tride), and liquid acetone. Two 9-volt batteries in each bomb were used as a power 
source. The batteries would be connected to light bulb filaments that would detonate the 
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bomb - something far less sophisticated than what was used in the 1980s by state-
sponsored terrorism. Yousef is also reputed to have wired a silicon controlled rectifier as 
the switch to trigger the filaments to detonate the bomb. 
 
The 2006 transatlantic plot was the next big terrorist plot. The plan was to deto-
nate liquid explosives carried onboard at least ten airliners travelling from the United 
Kingdom to the United States and Canada. The plot was unearthed and foiled by the Bri-
tish police, apparently far before it became fully operational. Immediate safety measures 
were put in place which delayed flights and caused long disruptions.  
 
The British seem to have acted pre-emptively, maybe under US pressure accor-
ding to numerous reports. The fact is some European counter-terrorism services did not 
receive any technical reports from the UK providing data about the IED itself and the ex-
plosives. That could mean that the terrorists’ plot was far from being fully operational. The 
trial began in April 2008 and ended in September 2008. The jury failed to reach a verdict 
on charges of conspiracy to kill by blowing up an aircraft, but the court did find three guilty 
of conspiracy to murder. In September 2009, a second jury found three individuals guilty 
of the plot. The British-Pakistani network had links in Pakistan and (through Rashid Rauf, 
who might later have been killed in a US drone attack), with the Al-Qaeda or some 
Kashmiri organization. 
 
The alleged plotters planned to use peroxide-based liquid explosives.
 
US authori-
ties have named named two peroxides that could be used: Acetone Peroxide (TATP) and 
Hexamethylene Triperoxide Diamine (HMTD). During the trial of the suspects, the prose-
cution stated that each alleged bomber would board a plane with the "necessary ingre-
dients and equipment" and begin the difficult process of assembling the bomb in the res-
troom of the plane. 
 
In the immediate aftermath of the first arrests, passenger rules were amended for 
flights between the United States and the United Kingdom in which all liquids (apart from 
baby milk) were forbidden, including beverages, hair gels, toothpaste, lipstick, sunscreen, 
and hand lotions due to the suspicion that liquids could be used in the attacks. 
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In contrast with the Bojinka plot, or even the 2006 transatlantic plot, the “shoe 
bomber” case was far less sophisticated. The perpetrator and self-claimed Al-Qaeda 
member, Richard Reid, was convicted by a US court for attempting to destroy a commer-
cial flight with an IED hidden in his shoes. Reid, who was radicalized in jail, attended 
radical mosques in London, was condemned for petty crime, and rudimentary trained in 
Afghanistan, did not have the profile of a potential highly skilled operational militant. He 
was instead a simple “soldier” of the cause. On 21
st
 December, 2001, he attempted to 
board a flight from Paris to Miami, but his boarding was delayed because his disheveled 
physical appearance raised suspicion amongst the screeners. He also did not answer all 
of their questions, and had not checked any luggage for the transatlantic flight. Additional 
screening resulted in his being re-issued a ticket for a flight on the following day. He re-
turned to the airport on 22
nd
 December, 2001, and boarded American Airlines Flight 63 
from Paris to Miami, wearing his special shoes packed with explosives in the hollowed-
out bottoms. At that time, preliminary forensic results indicated that Reid's shoes contai-
ned few grams of PETN explosive, enough to blow a hole in the plane and cause it to 
crash, or at least a sudden depressurization. 
 
Even if numerous sources indicate some complicities or even a failed planned 
coordinated attack against airliners, Reid’s profile and modus operandi are particularly 
sophisticated. But such an attempt has numerous advantages for the transnational jihadi 
networks, both, in theory and in practice: firstly, it allows for the testing of a militant; se-
condly, it tests the safety measures in civil aviation; thirdly, it can lead to the destruction 
of an airplane with high-profile victims (passengers); and lastly, it can provoke massive 
disruptions in airports and flight management. The “low-cost” of a suicidal militant is no-
thing in comparison to the potential political gains. 
 
The attempt made by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, a young Nigerian citizen, to 
detonate explosives hidden in his underwear on 25
th
 December, 2009, more than any-
thing resembles Richard Reid’s case. Their profiles might differ, but they are both highly 
representative of those “deterritorialized” young radicals– Reid coming from diasporas 
living in the UK and Abdulmutallab coming from an influential family in Nigeria. 
 
Both had transnational connections with radicals and sometimes prominent jiha-
dis (in Yemen or Pakistan). Both were well-travelled in Western countries which enabled 
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them to move around discreetly. And like Reid’s attempt, Abdulmutallab’s modus operan-
di did not appear to have much sophistication. The passengers and crew onboard the 
plane said Abdulmutallab spent about 20 minutes in the bathroom as it descended to-
wards Detroit, and then covered himself with a blanket after returning to his seat. They 
then heard popping noises accompnaied by a foul odor. Soon Abdulmutallab’s trouser 
and the wall of the plane were on fire. The explosive device, according open sources, 
consisted of a 15-cm packet of explosive powder which was sewn into his underwear, 
and a syringe containing acidic liquid. It was lately reported that the bomb materials also 
contained PETN, the same explosive that was allegedly used by Richard Reid in 2001. 
 
Finally, let us compare the methods that were used to destroy planes in the 1980s 
with those actually used by the terrorists today: 
 
 The devices currently used are simpler than those used in the 1980s, which 
probably indicates the increased level of security with regard to the detection of 
explosives and the identification of possible containers. 
 
 This progress in the levels of security has prompted the terrorists to adopt more 
modest practices. To try to pass through stringent airport security measures with 
explosives is risky but highly feasible given the low cost of the entire operation. 
At the same time the jihadi networks have drawn their lessons from the past.  
 
   The modus operandi of current jihadists is qualitatively limited (basic soldier of 
the jihad, IEDs whose certain components are easily reproducible by anyone 
who is fairly skilled) and quantitatively limited as well (low capacity of carrying by 
a man alone, not multiple targets but a single one), etc.  
 
 As a principle for modernizing counter-terrorism strategy, it is important to exer-
cise caution, as terrorism is bound to continue reinventing itself.  
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